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1 Introduction
In the era of streaming, sports has become the cornerstone to television programming. The
popularity of televised sports events keeps increasing and, for sports organizations, the sale
of broadcasting and media rights is currently their biggest source of revenue. This sale is
often collective, which generates an interesting problem of resource allocation, akin to well-
known problems already analyzed in the game-theory literature. Instances are airport problems
(e.g., Littlechild and Owen, 1973; Hu et al., 2012), bankruptcy problems (e.g., ONeill, 1982;
Thomson, 2019), telecommunications problems (e.g., van den Nouweland et al., 1996), museum
pass problems (e.g., Ginsburgh and Zang, 2003; Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero, 2015), cost
sharing in minimum cost spanning tree problems (e.g., Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga, 2007;
Trudeau, 2012), or labelled network games (e.g., Algaba et al., 2019a, 2019b).
In a recent paper (Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero, 2019a), we introduced a formal model
to analyze the problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues among par-
ticipating teams. Two main rules were highlighted therein. On the one hand, the so-called
equal-split rule which splits the revenue generated from each game equally among the partic-
ipating players (teams). On the other hand, the so-called concede-and-divide, which concedes
each player (team) the revenues generated from its fan base (properly estimated) and divides
equally the residual. Among other things, we showed that both rules are similarly characterized
by just three properties. Two properties are common in both characterizations. One (equal
treatment of equals) states that two teams with the same audiences should receive the same
amount; another (additivity) that revenues should be additive on the audience table. The third
property in each characterization comes from a pair of polar properties modeling the e¤ect of
null or essential teams. The null team property states that if each game played by a team
has no audience, then such team (called null) receives nothing. The essential team property
states that if only the games played by one team have positive audience, then such team (called
essential) receives all its audience. In a follow-up paper (Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero,
2019b) we show that a third axiom (maximum aspirations) stating that each team receives
at most the revenue generated by its overall audience, together with equal treatment of equals
and additivity, characterizes the family of all rules generated by convex combinations of the
equal-split rule and concede-and-divide.
A natural third rule (outside from the previous family) can also be considered for this model.
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It is the rule that divides the overall revenues generated in the tournament equally among all
participating teams. We refer to it as the uniform rule. This rule is used quite often in practice.
For instance, the football competitions of England, Italy and Spain divide around the 50% of
the revenues generated by TV broadcasting equally among all teams.
In this paper, we further explore the axiomatic approach to this problem and derive new
interesting results that uncover the structure of this stylized model further. To do so, we
consider new axioms that formalize alternative ways of allocating the extra revenue obtained
from additional viewers.
On the one hand, we consider a group of axioms stating di¤erent ways in which a rule
should react when additional viewers of some specic team appear. More precisely, assume
that a given tournament has more viewers than another tournament just because the games
involving a specic team (i) have more viewers. How should a rule allocate those extra viewers?
Our axioms consider three possible answers. The rst axiom just ignores the fact that all viewers
come from games involving team i. Then, all teams should equally share the extra benets.
We show that this axiom, together with equal treatment of equals, characterizes the uniform
rule. The second axiom considers that team i and the rest of the teams are in a symmetric
position because the audience of team i has increased the same amount as the audience of the
rest of the teams (combined). Then, the extra benets of team i should be equal to the sum
of the extra benets of the remaining teams. We show that this second axiom together with
equal treatment of equals characterizes the equal-split rule. The third axiom says that team i is
the only one to be credited for such an improvement. Then, team i should receive all the extra
benets. We show that this third axiom, together with equal treatment of equals, characterizes
concede-and-divide.
On the other hand, we consider an axiom referring to the incremental e¤ect of adding
additional viewers to a game. The axiom (equal benets from additional viewers) states that
the involved teams in the game should be a¤ected in the same amount. The same should
happen for the non-involved teams. Our last three results show that the combination of this
axiom with some other basic axioms also characterize the three rules mentioned above. More
precisely, equal benets from additional viewers, together with aggregate monotonicity (more
aggregate revenues cannot hurt any team) and non negativity, characterize the uniform rule.
If, instead, we add to equal benets from additional viewers the null team axiom (mentioned
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above), we characterize the equal-split rule, whereas if we add the essential team axiom (also
mentioned above), we characterize concede-and-divide.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the model, axioms and rules
in Section 2. In Section 3, we provide the characterization results. First, those involving equal
treatment of equals. Then, those involving equal benets from additional viewers. We conclude
in Section 4. Some proofs have been deferred to an appendix.
2 The model
We consider the model introduced by Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero (2019a). Let N describe
a nite set of teams. Its cardinality is denoted by n. Without loss of generality, we usually
take N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng. We assume n  3.
For each pair of teams i; j 2 N , we denote by aij the broadcasting audience (number of
viewers) for the game played by i and j at is stadium. We use the notational convention that
aii = 0, for each i 2 N . Let A 2 Ann denote the resulting matrix of broadcasting audiences
generated in the whole tournament involving the teams within N .1
Let i (A) denote the total audience achieved by team i, i.e.,
i (A) =
X
j2N
(aij + aji):
Without loss of generality, we normalize the revenue generated from each viewer to 1 (to be
interpreted as the pay per view fee). Thus, we sometimes refer to i (A) as the claim of team
i. When no confusion arises, we write i instead of i (A).
For each A 2 Ann, let jjAjj denote the total audience of the tournament. Namely,
jjAjj =
X
i;j2N
aij =
1
2
X
i2N
i:
A (broadcasting) problem is a matrix A 2 Ann dened as above. The family of all the
problems is denoted by P.
1We are therefore assuming a tournament in which each team plays each other team twice: once home,
another away. Our model could be extended to tournaments in which some teams play other teams a di¤erent
number of times. In such a case, aij would denote the broadcasting audience in all games played by i and j at
is stadium.
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2.1 Rules
A (sharing) rule R is a mapping that associates with each problem an allocation indicating the
amount each team gets from the total revenue generated by broadcasting games. As we have
normalized the revenue generated from each viewer to 1; R : P ! RN is such that, for each
A 2 P, X
i2N
Ri (A) = jjAjj:
We consider three focal rules. First, the one that divides the total audience equally among
the teams. Formally,
Uniform, U : for each A 2 P, and each i 2 N ,
Ui (A) =
jjAjj
n
:
The uniform rule is applied in many practical situations. For instance, the football compe-
titions of England, Italy and Spain divide an important part of the revenues generated by TV
broadcasting (50%, 40% and 50% respectively), following the uniform rule.
Another focal rule for this problem is the so-called equal-split rule, which splits equally the
audience of each game. Formally,
Equal-split, ES: for each A 2 P, and each i 2 N ,
ESi (A) =
i
2
:
The equal-split rule has game-theoretical foundations as, among other things, it coincides
with the Shapley value of a suitably associated TU-game to broadcasting problems (e.g.,
Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero, 2019a).
The third focal rule is concede-and-divide, which takes into account the number of fans of
each team. The audience of each game is divided by assigning to each team its number of fans
and the remainder audience is equally divided among both teams. Formally,
Concede-and-divide, CD: for each A 2 P, and each i 2 N ,
CDi (A) = i   (n  1)
P
j;k2Nnfig
(ajk + akj)
(n  2)(n  1)
=
(n  1)i   jjAjj
n  2
:
This rule can be rationalized by an intuitive statistical approach (e.g., Bergantiños and
Moreno-Ternero, 2019a).
5
2.2 Axioms
We now consider several axioms of rules. First, the most basic form of impartiality, which is
formalized by the following axiom. It says that if two teams have the same audiences, then
they should receive the same amount.
Equal treatment of equals: For each A 2 P, and each pair i; j 2 N such that aik = ajk,
and aki = akj, for each k 2 N n fi; jg,
Ri(A) = Rj(A):
The next axiom, which is inspired by the notion of solidarity, refers to the incremental e¤ect
of adding additional viewers to a game. It states that the involved teams should be a¤ected in
the same amount. The same should happen for the non-involved teams. Formally,
Equal benets from additional viewers: For each pair A; A0 2 P such that aij = a
0
ij,
for each pair (i; j) 6= (i0; j0), and ai0;j0 < a
0
i0;j0
, we have
Ri0(A
0) Ri0(A) = Rj0(A
0) Rj0(A);
and
Ri(A
0) Ri(A) = Rj(A
0) Rj(A);
when fi; jg  Nn fi0; j0g.
We also consider a group of axioms that are closely related, as they state how a rule should
react when additional viewers (of some specic team) appear. More precisely, let A; A0 2 P
and i 2 N such that aij  a
0
ij and aji  a
0
ji for each j 2 N n fig and ajk = a
0
jk when i =2 fj; kg.
Note that tournament A0 has more viewers than tournament A just because the games involving
team i have more viewers. How should a rule allocate those extra viewers? Our axioms consider
three possible answers.2
First, we just ignore the fact that all viewers come from games involving team i and assume
that all teams should equally share those additional viewers. Formally,
2Note that the three axioms are mutually exclusive.
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Equal sharing of additional team viewers: For each pair A, A0 2 P, and each i 2 N
such that aij  a
0
ij and aji  a
0
ji for each j 2 N n fig and ajk = a
0
jk when i =2 fj; kg, then for
each j 2 N
Rj (A
0) Rj (A) =
jjA0jj   jjAjj
n
:
Second, we consider that team i and the rest of the teams are in a symmetric position
because the audience of team i has increased the same amount than the audience of the rest
of the teams (combined). Namely, i (A
0)   i (A) = jjA
0jj   jjAjj =
P
j2Nnfig
(j (A
0)  j (A)).
Thus, team i should increase as much as the rest of the teams combined. Formally,
Half sharing of additional team viewers: For each pair A, A0 2 P, and each i 2 N
such that aij  a
0
ij and aji  a
0
ji for each j 2 N n fig and ajk = a
0
jk when i =2 fj; kg, then
Ri (A
0) Ri (A) =
X
j2Nnfig
(Rj (A
0) Rj (A)) =
jjA0jj   jjAjj
2
:
Third, we assume that team i is the only one to be credited for such an improvement and,
thus, should not share the benets with the rest of the teams. Formally,
No sharing of additional team viewers: For each pair A, A0 2 P, and each i 2 N such
that aij  a
0
ij and aji  a
0
ji for each j 2 N n fig and ajk = a
0
jk when i =2 fj; kg, then
Ri (A
0) Ri (A) = jjA
0jj   jjAjj :
Finally, we also introduce four additional axioms.3
The rst one says that if a team has a null audience, then such a team gets no revenue.
Formally,
Null team: For each A 2 P, and each i 2 N , such that for each j 2 N , aij = 0 = aji,
Ri(A) = 0:
The second one is sort of dual to the rst one as it says that if only the games played by one
team have positive audience, then such an essential team should receive all its claim. Formally,
Essential team: For each A 2 P, and each i 2 N such that ajk = 0 for each pair
fj; kg 2 Nn fig,
Ri(A) = i:
3The rst two were introduced in Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero (2019a).
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The next axiom says that if the overall audience in a tournament is higher than in another,
then no team can lose from it. Formally,
Aggregate Monotonicity: for each A; A0 2 P such that jjAjj  jjA0jj, we have that for
each i 2 N
Ri (A)  Ri (A
0) :
The last axiom simply states that no team can receive a negative amount.
Non negativity. For each (N;A) 2 P and each i 2 N ,
Ri (A)  0:
3 Characterizations
We divide this section in two parts. In the rst part, we show that the combination of equal
treatment of equals with each of the three axioms modeling the allocation of the extra revenues
generated from a specic team, leads to a characterization of each of the three focal rules
dened above. In the second part, we consider equal benets from additional viewers, instead of
equal treatment of equals, and show that we also characterize the same three rules with di¤erent
combinations of the axioms presented above.
3.1 With equal treatment of equals
We rst show that the axioms of equal treatment of equals and equal sharing of additional team
viewers characterize the uniform rule.
Theorem 1 A rule satises equal treatment of equals and equal sharing of additional team
viewers if and only if it is the uniform rule.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that the uniform rule satises the two axioms in the
statement. Conversely, let R be a rule satisfying equal treatment of equals and equal sharing
of additional team viewers. Let A 2 P. For each i = 0; 1; :::; n   1 we dene the matrix Ai
obtained from A by considering only the audiences of the teams f1; :::; ig. Namely,
Aijk =
8<
:
ajk if min fj; kg  i
0 otherwise.
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Notice that A0 is the matrix where all entries are 0 and An 1 = A: As R satises equal
treatment of equals, Rj (A
0) = 0 for each j 2 N:
Let i 2 Nn fng : As Ai 1 and Ai are under the hypothesis of equal sharing of additional
team viewers, we deduce that, for each j 2 N ,
Rj
 
N;Ai

 Rj
 
N;Ai 1

=
jjAijj   jjAi 1jj
n
:
Thus, for each j 2 N ,
Rj (N;A) =
n 1X
i=0
 
Rj
 
N;Ai

 Rj
 
N;Ai 1

=
n 1X
i=0
jjAijj   jjAi 1jj
n
=
jjAn 1jj
n
=
jjAjj
n
= Uj (N;A) :
The next result characterizes the equal-split rule as a result of replacing equal sharing of
additional team viewers by half sharing of additional team viewers in Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 A rule satises equal treatment of equals and half sharing of additional team view-
ers if and only if it is the equal-split rule.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that the equal-split rule satises equal treatment of equals.
We now prove that it also satises half sharing of additional team viewers. Let A; A0 and i as
in the denition of the axiom. Then,
X
j2Nnfig
(ESj (A
0)  ESj (A)) =
1
2
X
j2Nnfig
(j (A
0)  j (A))
=
1
2
X
j2Nnfig
 
a0ij + a
0
ji   (aij + aji)

=
1
2
[i (A
0)  i (A)]
= ESi (A
0)  ESi (A) :
As
P
j2N
(ESj (A
0)  ESj (A)) = jjA
0jj   jjAjj we have that
ESi (A
0)  ESi (A) =
X
j2Nnfig
(ESj (A
0)  ESj (A)) =
jjA0jj   jjAjj
2
:
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Conversely, let R be a rule satisfying equal treatment of equals and half sharing of additional
team viewers. We proceed by induction on the number of pairs of teams with positive audience.
Formally, let
s = jf(i; j) 2 N N such that aij > 0gj :
If s = 0 then A = 0 and, by equal treatment of equals, Ri (0) = 0 for each i 2 N:
Assume now that s  1. Let i 2 N be such that there exists i0 2 N such that aii0 + ai0i > 0:
We consider the problem Aii
0
dened as follows:
aii
0
jk =
8<
:
ajk if fj; kg 6= fi; i
0g
0 otherwise.
By half sharing of additional team viewers,
Ri (A) Ri

Aii
0

=
jjAjj  
Aii0
2
=
aii0 + ai0i
2
:
Equivalently,
Ri (A) = Ri

Aii
0

+
aii0 + ai0i
2
.
By the induction hypothesis, Ri
 
Aii
0

= ESi
 
Aii
0

: Then,
Ri (A) = ESi

Aii
0

+
aii0 + ai0i
2
= ESi (A) :
We now consider the partition of N between null teams and non-null teams. Formally, let
M = fi 2 N : aii0 + ai0i > 0 for some i
0 2 Ng , and
M c = fi 2 N : aii0 = ai0i = 0 for each i
0 2 Ng :
If M c = ? then the above proves that R (A) = ES (A). Suppose now that M c 6= ?: Let
i 2M .4 Then, all agents in M c have the same audiences (actually, 0) in A and Aii
0
. Then, by
equal treatment of equals, Rj (A) = Rk (A) and Rj
 
Aii
0

= Rk
 
Aii
0

, for each j; k 2M c. Thus,
we can dene x = Rj (A) Rj
 
Aii
0

for each j 2M c.
Now,
aii0 + ai0i = jjAjj  
Aii0 =X
j2N
Rj (A) 
X
j2N
Rj

Aii
0

=
X
j2M

Rj (A) Rj

Aii
0

+
X
j2Mc

Rj (A) Rj

Aii
0

=
X
j2M

Rj (A) Rj

Aii
0

+ jM cjx: (1)
4Since s  1 we have that M 6= ?.
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We have proved above that, for each j 2M , Rj (A) = ESj (A) : By the induction hypothesis,
Rj
 
Aii
0

= ESj
 
Aii
0

, for each j 2 M: As ESj (A) = ESj
 
Aii
0

for each j 2 Nn fi; i0g and
fi; i0g M we have that
X
j2M

Rj (A) Rj

Aii
0

=
X
j2fi;i0g

Rj (A) Rj

Aii
0

= aii0 + ai0i:
Then, 0 = jM cjx; which implies that x = 0. Thus, for each j 2M c; Rj (A) = Rj
 
Aii
0

:
As, by induction, Rj
 
Aii
0

= ESj
 
Aii
0

for each j 2M c and ESj
 
Aii
0

= ESj (A) for each
j 2M c, we deduce that Rj (A) = ESj (A) for each j 2M
c:
The next corollary shows that we can replace equal treatment of equals by null team in the
statement of Theorem 2.
Corollary 1 A rule satises null team and half sharing of additional team viewers if and only
if it is the equal-split rule.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that the equal-split rule satises null team. Conversely,
one just has to notice that, in the proof of Theorem 2, equal treatment of equals is used twice.
First, two obtain that Ri (0) = 0 for each i 2 N . The same conclusion could be obtained with
null team. Second, to prove that Rj (A) = ES (A) for each j 2 M
c: With null team such a
proof is obvious because each j 2 M c is a null team in A and hence Rj (A) = 0 = ES (A) for
each j 2M c:
Finally, the next theorem gives a characterization of concede-and-divide resorting to no
sharing of additional team viewers.
Theorem 3 A rule satises equal treatment of equals and no sharing of additional team viewers
if and only if it is concede and divide.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that concede-and-divide satises equal treatment of equals.
We now prove that it also satises no sharing of additional team viewers. Let A; A0 and i as in
11
the denition of the axiom. Then,
CDi (A
0)  CDi (A) = i (A
0) 
P
j;k2Nnfig
 
a0jk + a
0
kj

n  2
  i (A) +
P
j;k2Nnfig
(ajk + akj)
n  2
= i (A
0)  i (A)
=
X
j2Nnfig

a0ij + a
0
ji   (aij + aji)

= jjA0jj   jjAjj :
Conversely, let R be a rule satisfying the two axioms. We proceed by induction on the
number of pairs of teams with positive audience. Formally, let
s = jf(i; j) 2 N N such that aij > 0gj :
If s = 0 then A = 0 and, by equal treatment of equals, Ri (0) = 0 = CDi (0) for each i 2 N:
Assume now that s  1. Let i 2 N be such that there exists i0 2 N such that aii0 + ai0i > 0:
We consider the problem Aii
0
dened as in the proof of Theorem 2.
By no sharing of additional team viewers,
Ri (A) Ri

Aii
0

= jjAjj  
Aii0 = aii0 + ai0i:
Equivalently,
Ri (A) = Ri

Aii
0

+ aii0 + ai0i.
By the induction hypothesis, Ri
 
Aii
0

= CDi
 
Aii
0

: Then,
Ri (A) = CDi

Aii
0

+ aii0 + ai0i = CDi (A) :
We consider the partition fM;M cg of N as in the proof of Theorem 2.
If M c = ? then the above proves that R (A) = CD (A) : Suppose now that M c 6= ?: Let
x be dened as in the proof of Theorem 2. We can prove that equation (1) also holds in this
case.
We have proved above that, for each j 2M; Rj (A) = CDj (A) : By the induction hypothesis,
Rj
 
Aii
0

= CDj
 
Aii
0

, for each j 2M:
We now consider two cases:
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1. j 2 fi; i0g : Then,
Rj (A) Rj

Aii
0

=
(n  1)j (A)  jjAjj
n  2
 
(n  1)j
 
Aii
0

 
Aii0
n  2
=
(n  1)
 
j (A)  j
 
Aii
0

n  2
 
jjAjj  
Aii0
n  2
=
(n  1) (aii0 + ai0i)
n  2
 
aii0 + ai0i
n  2
= aii0 + ai0i:
2. j 2Mn fi; i0g : Then,
Rj (A) Rj

Aii
0

=
(n  1)
 
j (A)  j
 
Aii
0

n  2
 
jjAjj  
Aii0
n  2
=  
aii0 + ai0i
n  2
:
Then,
aii0 + ai0i = 2 (aii0 + ai0i)  jMn fi; i
0gj
aii0 + ai0i
n  2
+ jM cjx:
As jM cj = n  2  jMn fi; i0gj we have that
x =  
aii0 + ai0i
n  2
:
Let j 2M c: Then,
Rj (A) = Rj

Aii
0

 
aii0 + ai0i
n  2
:
By induction, Rj
 
Aii
0

= CDj
 
Aii
0

: Then,
Rj (A) = CDj

Aii
0

 
aii0 + ai0i
n  2
= CDj (A) :
3.2 With equal benets from additional viewers
We now provide a second set of characterization results, replacing equal treatment of equals by
equal benets from additional viewers in the results from the previous section, and resorting to
some other axioms.
The rst result in this set characterizes the uniform rule.
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Theorem 4 A rule satises equal benets from additional viewers, aggregate monotonicity and
non negativity if and only if it is the uniform rule.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that the uniform rule satises equal benets from additional
viewers, aggregate monotonicity and non negativity. Conversely, let R be a rule satisfying the
three axioms. We proceed by induction on the number of pairs of teams with positive audience.
Formally, let
s = jf(i; j) 2 N N such that aij > 0gj :
If s = 0 then A = 0 and, by non negativity, Ri (0) = 0 = Ui (0) for each i 2 N:
Let s  1. Let (i1; i2) such that ai1i2 > 0. And let i
3 be such that i3 =2 fi1; i2g :We consider
the problems A; A1; and A2 dened as follows.
akk0 =
8<
:
jjAjj   ai1i2 if (k; k
0) = (i1; i3)
0 otherwise.
a1kk0 =
8>>><
>>>:
ai1i2 if (k; k
0) = (i1; i2)
jjAjj   ai1i2 if (k; k
0) = (i1; i3)
0 otherwise.
a2kk0 =
8>>><
>>>:
ai1i2 if (k; k
0) = (i2; i3)
jjAjj   ai1i2 if (k; k
0) = (i1; i3)
0 otherwise.
By equal benets from additional viewers,
Rk
 
A1

 Rk (A
) =
8<
:
x1 k 2 fi1; i2g
y1 otherwise
and
Rk
 
A2

 Rk (A
) =
8<
:
x2 k 2 fi2; i3g
y2 otherwise
As we can apply the induction hypothesis to A,
Ri1
 
A1

= Ri1 (A
) +Ri1
 
A1

 Ri1 (A
) = Ui1 (A
) + x1; and
Ri1
 
A2

= Ri1 (A
) +Ri1
 
A2

 Ri1 (A
) = Ui1 (A
) + y2
By aggregate monotonicity, R (A1) = R (A2) : Thus, x1 = y2: If we proceed with i3 instead
of i1 we can obtain that x2 = y1: If we proceed with i2 instead of i1 we can obtain that x1 = x2:
Then x1 = x2 = y1 = y2:
14
Now,
ai1i2 =
X
k2N
 
Rk
 
A1

 Rk (A
)

= 2x1 + (n  2) y1 = nx1;
which implies that
x1 =
ai1i2
n
:
Let i 2 N: By aggregate monotonicity, Ri (A) = Ri (A
1) : Then,
Ri (A) = Ri
 
A1

= Ri (A
) +Ri
 
A1

 Ri (A
) = Ui (A
) +
ai1i2
n
= Ui (A) :
The next result characterizes the equal-split rule.
Theorem 5 A rule satises equal benets from additional viewers and null team if and only if
it is the equal-split rule.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that the equal-split rule satises equal benets from
additional viewers, and null team. Conversely, let R be a rule satisfying the two axioms. We
proceed by induction on the number of pairs of teams with positive audience. Formally, let
s = jf(i; j) 2 N N such that aij > 0gj :
If s = 0 then A = 0 and, by null team, Ri (0) = 0 = ESi (0) for each i 2 N:
If s = 1, there exists (i1; j1) such that ai1j1 > 0 and aij = 0 otherwise. By null team
Ri (A) = 0 for each i 2 Nn fi
1; j1g :
By equal benets from additional viewers,
Ri1 (A) Ri1 (0) = Rj1 (A) Rj1 (0) :
As Ri1 (0) = Rj1 (0) = 0 we have that Ri1 (A) = Rj1 (A) : Thus, Ri1 (A) = Rj1 (A) =
a
i1j1
2
and hence R (A) = ES (A) :
Let s  2: Let (i1; j1) and (i2; j2) such that ai1j1 > 0 and ai2j2 > 0: Two cases are possible.
First, (i1; j1) = (j2; i2) : Let A0 be obtained from A by making ai2j2 = 0: By the induction
hypothesis R (A0) = ES (A0) : Using similar arguments as in the case s = 1 (with A0 instead of
0) we can deduce that R (A) = ES (A) :
15
Second, (i1; j1) 6= (j2; i2) : Then, there exist i; j 2 N such that i 2 fi1; j1g n fi2; j2g ; j 2
fi2; j2g n fi1; j1g and i 6= j: We consider the problems A 1; A 2; and A 12 dened as follows:
a 1kk0 =
8<
:
0 (k; k0) = (i1; j1)
akk0 otherwise
a 2kk0 =
8<
:
0 (k; k0) = (i2; j2)
akk0 otherwise
a 12kk0 =
8<
:
0 (k; k0) 2 f(i1; j1) ; (i2; j2)g
akk0 otherwise
By equal benets from additional viewers,
Rk (A) Rk
 
A 1

=
8<
:
x1 k 2 fi1; j1g
y1 otherwise
and
Rk (A) Rk
 
A 2

=
8<
:
x2 k 2 fi2; j2g
y2 otherwise
By equal benets from additional viewers, and the induction hypothesis
Ri (A) Ri
 
A 12

= Ri (A) Ri
 
A 1

+Ri
 
A 1

 Ri
 
A 12

= x1
Ri (A) Ri
 
A 12

= Ri (A) Ri
 
A 2

+Ri
 
A 2

 Ri
 
A 12

= y2 +
ai1j1
2
Rj (A) Rj
 
A 12

= Rj (A) Rj
 
A 1

+Rj
 
A 1

 Rj
 
A 12

= y1 +
ai2j2
2
Rj (A) Rj
 
A 12

= Rj (A) Rj
 
A 2

+Rj
 
A 2

 Rj
 
A 12

= x2
Thus, we have the following equations:
x1   y2 =
ai1j1
2
; (2)
x2   y1 =
ai2j2
2
: (3)
As
X
k2N
 
Rk (A) Rk
 
A 1

= ai1j1 ; and
X
k2N
 
Rk (A) Rk
 
A 2

= ai2j2 ;
we have the following equations too:
2x1 + (n  2) y1 = ai1j1 ; (4)
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2x2 + (n  2) y2 = ai2j2 : (5)
Straightforward algebraic computations allow us to show that the system of the four equa-
tions listed above has an unique solution, which is given by
x1 =
ai1j1
2
; x2 =
ai2j2
2
; and y1 = y2 = 0:
By the induction hypothesis, R (A 1) = ES (A 1). Given k 2 fi1; j1g ;
Rk (A) = Rk
 
A 1

+

Rk (A) Rk
 
A 1

= ES
 
A 1

+
ai1j1
2
= ESk (A) :
Similarly, we can prove that, given k 2 Nn fi1; j1g ; Rk (A) = ESk (A) :
Our nal result is a counterpart characterization for concede-and-divide.
Theorem 6 A rule satises equal benets from additional viewers and essential team if and
only if it is concede-and-divide.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that concede-and-divide satises equal benets from addi-
tional viewers and essential team. Conversely, let R be a rule satisfying the two axioms. We
proceed by induction on the number of pairs of teams with positive audience. Formally, let
s = jf(i; j) 2 N N such that aij > 0gj :
If s = 0 then A = 0 and, by essential team, Ri (0) = 0 = ESi (0) for each i 2 N:
If s = 1, there exists (i1; j1) such that ai1j1 > 0 and aij = 0 otherwise. By essential team,
Ri (A) = ai1j1 for each i 2 fi
1; j1g :
By equal benets from additional viewers, for each i; j 2 Nn fi1; j1g
Ri (A) Ri (0) = Rj (A) Rj (0) :
As Ri (0) = Rj (0) = 0 we have that Ri (A) = Rj (A) : As
P
i2N
Ri (A) = ai1j1 we deduce that
Ri (A) =  
a
i1j1
n 2
for each i 2 Nn fi1; j1g. Hence, R (A) = CD (A) :
Let s  2: Let (i1; j1) and (i2; j2) such that ai1j1 > 0 and ai2j2 > 0: We consider two cases:
First, (i1; j1) = (j2; i2) : Let A0 be obtained from A by making ai2j2 = 0: By the induction
hypothesis, R (A0) = CD (A0) : By essential team, Ri (A) = ai1j1 + ai2j2 = CDi (A) for each
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i 2 fi1; j1g. Using similar arguments as in the case s = 1 (with A0 instead of 0) we can deduce
that Ri (A) = CDi (A) for each i 2 Nn fi
1; j1g.
Second, (i1; j1) 6= (j2; i2) : Then, there exists i; j 2 N such that i 2 fi1; j1g n fi2; j2g ;
j 2 fi2; j2g n fi1; j1g and i 6= j: We consider the problems A 1; A 2; and A 12; x1; y1; x2 and
y2 dened as in the proof of Theorem 5. Similarly to such a proof we can obtain the following
system of equations 8>>>>>><
>>>>>>:
x1   y2 = ai1j1  
a
i2j2
n 2
,
x2   y1 = ai2j2  
a
i1j1
n 2
,
2x1 + (n  2) y1 = ai1j1,
2x2 + (n  2) y2 = ai2j2.
The unique solution to this system is
x1 = ai1j1 ; x
2 = ai2j2 ; y
1 =  
ai1j1
n  2
, and y2 =  
ai2j2
n  2
:
By the induction hypothesis R (A 1) = CD (A 1). Given k 2 fi1; j1g ;
Rk (A) = Rk
 
A 1

+

Rk (A) Rk
 
A 1

= CD
 
A 1

+ ai1j1
= CDk (A) :
Similarly, we can prove that, given k 2 Nn fi1; j1g ; Rk (A) = CDk (A) :
3.3 Summary
All the results described above are tight (the proofs are gathered in the Appendix). Namely,
all the axioms considered in them are independent. The next table summarizes our ndings.
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Axioms / Rules U ES CD
Equal treatment of equals YESTh1 YESTh2 YESTh3
Equal sharing of additional team viewers YESTh1 NO NO
Half sharing of additional team viewers NO YESTh2;Cor1 NO
No sharing of additional team viewers NO NO YESTh3
Equal benets from additional viewers YESTh4 YESTh5 YESTh6
Null team NO YESTh5;Cor1 NO
Essential team NO NO YESTh6
Aggregate monotonicity YESTh4 NO NO
Non negativity YESTh4 YES NO
Most of the statements of the table have been proven in the text. The remaining are
straightforward.
4 Discussion
We have explored in this paper new axioms (mostly referring to the allocation of extra resources)
for the problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues. These axioms provide
normative support for three focal rules in this setting. Two of these rules had been characterized
already in Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero (2019a). The main novelty of the results presented
here, with respect to those, is to dismiss additivity, an axiom with long tradition in axiomatic
work (e.g., Shapley, 1953), but also with strong implications. More precisely, the additivity
requirement in our setting precludes the allocation of revenue aij to depend on any other
information contained in the matrix A. Our results here demonstrate that this feature is also
a by-product of the combination of more fundamental axioms.
It is left for further research to explore the logical implications of other axioms related to
the principle of solidarity, with a strong tradition in the theory of justice (e.g., Moreno-Ternero
and Roemer, 2006). We have used in this paper one of the axioms within this group, aggregate
monotonicity, which is a special form of the standard axiom of resource monotonicity in fair
allocation (e.g., Moreno-Ternero and Roemer, 2012). Other monotonicity notions, reecting,
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for instance, the e¤ect on each team when the audiences of a given team increases, would be
interesting to analyze as they might provide normative foundations for new rules.
Finally, one could also be interested into approaching our problems with a (cooperative)
game-theoretical approach. This is a typical course of action in some of the related problems
listed at the Introduction. In Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero (2019a), we associate to our
problems a natural optimistic cooperative TU game in which, for each subset of teams we dene
its worth as the total audience of the games played by the teams in that subset. The Shapley
value (e.g., Shapley, 1953) of such a game yields the same solutions as the equal-split rule for
the original problem.5 It is straightforward to show that the equal-division value (e.g., van
den Brink, 2007) of that game yields the same solutions as the uniform rule considered (and
characterized) here. It would be interesting to explore whether concede-and-divide could also
be associated to another value. On the other hand, it would also be interesting to explore a
natural (dual) pesimistic TU game and the connections between our rules and the well-known
values for such a game. Alternatively, one could consider a similar approach associating a pure
bargaining problem, instead of a TU game, to our broadcasting problem. The challenge would
then be to explore the connections between classical bargaining solutions (e.g., Nash, 1950;
Kalai and Smorodinski, 1975) and rules for our problem.
5Due to the properties of this game, the Shapley value also coincides with two other well-known values: the
Nucleolus (e.g., Schmeidler, 1969) and the  -value (e.g., Tijs, 1987). It is also guaranteed to be a selection of
the core.
20
References
[1] Algaba E., Fragnelli, V., Llorca, N., Sánchez-Soriano, J., 2019a. Horizontal cooperation in
a multimodal public transport system: The prot allocation problem. European Journal
of Operational Research 275, 659-665.
[2] Algaba E., Béal, S., Fragnelli, V., Llorca, N., Sánchez-Soriano, J., 2019b. Relationship
between labeled network games and other cooperative games arising from attributes situ-
ations. Economics Letters 185, 108708.
[3] Bergantiños, G., Moreno-Ternero, J.D., 2015. The axiomatic approach to the problem of
sharing the revenue from museum passes. Games and Economic Behavior 89, 78-92.
[4] Bergantiños, G., Moreno-Ternero, J.D., 2019a. Sharing the revenues from broadcasting
sport events. Management Science. Forthcoming.
[5] Bergantiños, G., Moreno-Ternero, J.D., 2019b. A family of rules to share the revenues from
broadcasting sport events. UPO/ECON Working Paper 2019/07.
[6] Bergantiños, G., Vidal-Puga, J., 2007. A fair rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems.
Journal of Economic Theory 137, 26-352.
[7] Brink van den, R., 2007. Null or nullifying players: The di¤erence between the Shapley
value and equal division solutions. Journal of Economic Theory 136, 767-775
[8] Ginsburgh, V., Zang, I., 2003. The museum pass game and its value. Games and Economic
Behavior 43, 322-325.
[9] Hu, C.-C., M.-H Tsay, and C.-H. Yeh, 2012. Axiomatic and strategic justications for the
constrained equal benets rule in the airport problem. Games and Economic Behavior 75,
185-197.
[10] Kalai, E., Smorodinsky, M., Other solution to the Nashs bargaining problem. Economet-
rica 43, 513-518.
[11] Littlechild, S., Owen. G., 1973, A simple expression for the Shapley value in a special case.
Management Science 20, 370-372.
21
[12] van den Nouweland, A., Borm, P., van Golstein Brouwers, W., Groot Bruinderink, R., Tijs,
S., 1996. A Game Theoretic Approach to Problems in Telecommunication. Management
Science 42, 294-303.
[13] Moreno-Ternero, J., Roemer, J., 2006. Impartiality, priority and solidarity in the theory
of justice. Econometrica 74, 1419-1427.
[14] Moreno-Ternero, J., Roemer, J., 2012. A common ground for resource and welfare egali-
tarianism. Games and Economic Behavior 75, 832-841.
[15] Nash, J., 1950. The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18, 155-162.
[16] ONeill, B., 1982. A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud. Mathematical Social
Sciences 2, 345-371.
[17] Schmeidler, D., 1969. The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game. SIAM Journal of
Applied Mathematics 17, 1163-1170.
[18] Shapley, L., 1953. A value for n-person games, in Contributions to the Theory of Games
II (Annals of Mathematics Studies 28), ed. by H.W. Kuhn and A.W. Tucker, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 307-317.
[19] Thomson W., 2019. How to divide when there isnt enough: from Aristotle, the Talmud,
and Maimonides to the axiomatics of resource allocation, Econometric Society Monograph.
Cambridge University Press.
[20] Tijs, S.H., 1987. An axiomatization of the  -value. Mathematical Social Sciences 13, 177-
181.
[21] Trudeau, C., 2012. A new stable and more responsive cost sharing solution for minimum
cost spanning tree problems. Games and Economic Behavior 75, 402-412.
22
To save space, we have included in this appendix, which is not for publication, the proofs
that all our results are tight.
Appendix
Remark 1 The axioms of Theorem 1 are independent.
Let   figi2N be such that
P
i2N i = 0 and i > 0 for some i 2 N: For each A and i 2 N;
we dene the rule RU; as follows:
RU;i (A) = i + Ui (A) :
Then RU; satises equal sharing of additional team viewers but violates equal treatment of
equals.
The equal-split rule satises equal treatment of equals but violates equal sharing of additional
team viewers.
Remark 2 The axioms of Theorem 2 are independent.
Let   figi2N be such that
P
i2N i = 0 and i > 0 for some i 2 N: For each A and i 2 N;
we dene the rule RES; as follows.
RES;i (A) = i + ESi (A) :
Then RES; satises half sharing of additional team viewers but violates equal treatment of
equals.
The uniform rule satises equal treatment of equals but violates half sharing of additional
team viewers.
Remark 3 The axioms of Corollary 1 are independent.
RES; satises half sharing of additional team viewers but violates null team.
Consider the rule that divides jjAjj equally among the non-null teams. Such a rule satises
null team but violates half sharing of additional team viewers.
Remark 4 The axioms of Theorem 3 are independent.
Let  = figi2N be such that
P
i2N i = 0 and i > 0 for some i 2 N: For each A and i 2 N;
we dene the rule RCD; as follows.
RCD;i (A) = i + CDi (A) :
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Then RCD; satises no sharing of additional team viewers but violates equal treatment of
equals.
The uniform rule satises equal treatment of equals but violates no sharing of additional
team viewers.
Remark 5 The axioms of Theorem 4 are independent.
RU; satises equal benets from additional viewers and aggregate monotonicity but violates
non negativity.
The equal-split rule satises equal benets from additional viewers and non negativity but
violates aggregate monotonicity.
Let  2 n
 
1
n
; :::; 1
n
	
where  is the unit simplex. Then, the weighted version of the uni-
form rule according to , (Ui (A) = i jjAjj) satises aggregate monotonicity and non negativity
but violates equal benets from additional viewers.
Remark 6 The axioms of Theorem 5 are independent.
The uniform rule satises equal sharing of additional team viewers but not null-team.
Let Rlowest be the rule in which, for each game (i; j) 2 N N the revenue goes to the team
with the lowest number of the two. Namely, for each problem A 2 P, and each i 2 N;
Rlowesti (A) =
X
j2N :j>i
(aij + aji):
Rlowest satises null-team but violates equal sharing of additional team viewers.
Remark 7 The axioms of Theorem 6 are independent.
The uniform rule satises equal sharing of additional team viewers but not essential team.
We consider the rule dened as CD (A) when the problem A has essential teams and ES (A)
when there is not essential teams in A: This rule satises essential team but not equal sharing
of additional team viewers.
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